It started as a joke in 11th grade. Five of us — close friends — half-joked that we'd start a company together someday. What that company would actually be, none of us had a clue.
The first attempt. In 2014, during the FIFA World Cup, one of us finally had an idea. Four of the five were still in Bangalore, so we decided to give it a shot — without leaving our paying jobs. We tried relentlessly for months. The idea didn't work out, but it buried something in us: a quiet promise that we'd try again, full-time, once we were a little more financially stable.
Then life happened. Some of us got married; I started a family. In 2020, days before the first nationwide lockdown, one of those friends told me he was going all-in — full-time, fully bootstrapped, on a company. I wasn't ready to jump yet, so I did the next best thing: I became their technical advisor, helping with everything engineering, right up to May 2023.
How I actually joined. That May, another friend was getting married, and we threw a bachelor party — the first time in years all of us were together for a whole weekend. One thing led to another, and I joined Pangea Tech as its CTO. It was an explainable-AI and analytics company at the time — but OpenAI had just started making noise, and we decided to catch the wave early and pivot into a full-blown technology company. A few months in, I became a co-founder too, and the two of us went into full build mode.
The bootstrapped model. Bootstrapped means you fund your own dreams. So we ran a solutions vertical — real client work that brought in revenue — to pay for building our own products. The long game never changed: become a platform-and-products company, not a services shop.
Our first $1M client. The early full-time days were about landing long-term deals. We got talking to a high-end veterinary-care company in the US that wanted an entire digital platform and ecosystem of applications to be the backbone of their business. We signed long-term deals with them — our first $1M client — and became part of their growth, which fuelled ours for three years. At our peak we were 65 people across every function; we'd opened our first international business-development office in Florida and recruited our first head of sales.
That vet-care platform is one of the things I'm proudest of. We built the whole thing — booking, payments, subscriptions, veterinary-management-system integrations, medical records — a ~10-application ecosystem that took them from a single clinic to 80+ and 150,000+ users in three years. Later we took it up a level: a medallion data warehouse powering roughly 30 dashboards, and AI agents on both sides — customer-facing (an autonomous booking agent) and internal quality — all of it well received.
The products we built along the way. In the early days we had two of our own: TuringXai, an explainable-AI product, and Turtlemoves, our first real experiment in generative AI — text-to-image, an image-editing canvas, and more. Turtlemoves taught us an enormous amount, but the infrastructure cost never justified taking it to production. That was a lesson in itself: knowing when to stop is as much a skill as knowing what to build.
Production AI, before the playbook existed. A few months later we worked out a deal with a Fortune 500 insurance major to build a solution for their sales academy. It was our first crack at RAG in the early GPT-3.5 era — with a live co-pilot and a video-generation module. We built it, grounded it strictly in their approved content, and moved it to production, open to 45,000+ sales agents across the globe. It cut training-content creation from about five days to under fifteen minutes, and gave agents a live in-call co-pilot that answered in under three seconds. We were early enough on MongoDB's vector database that their product team sat down with us to compare notes.
The spine. Underneath all of it, we built a spine — a library of reusable modules that could form the base of almost any solution: identity, AI, storage, parsing and database services. It's why a new build could reach v1 in under eight weeks. We kept winning deals, and kept executing them well.
Two more products — Sonorca and Commind. Sonorca was born on a sales call, when a client asked whether we could do data analysis in plain English. It wasn't common yet — but as we built it, we started hearing that the likes of Uber, Snowflake and Databricks were chasing the same idea, which was all the market validation we needed. We built it with workflow and agentic-AI elements, ran pilots, and had mixed success.
Commind came out of a hackathon challenge: do more with the tribal knowledge scattered across OneDrive, desktops and bookmarks. It was a RAG-based, research-and-output knowledge platform. The pilots were a mixed bag, and it's something I kept building solo on the side. The takeaway was sharp — it can't be generic; it needs a vertical. So we aimed it at sales and meeting intelligence: transcribe calls, generate action items, connect to downstream systems, and become the hub where account managers generate account briefs and QBRs with far more context and accuracy.
Not everything was rosy. We made real mistakes — over-projecting our growth, over-hiring, and sometimes hiring the wrong people. Somewhere in there we felt we were losing our execution against our own vision. We pivoted a few times; some of it worked for a while. But ultimately, in early 2026, we made the hardest call of the whole journey: to wind down.
What I'm proudest of in that ending is that we saw it coming. We gave every one of our employees the runway to find their next role — and they did, which told us we'd worked on the right technology, executed well, and skilled our people right. Some of our mistakes were just too big to turn around while still carrying an organisation, so we chose the reset over limping on.
I freelance on the side now — but I've decided it's time to join another mission, and to keep learning with more focus than a founder's thousand hats allow.